A New Name in a Familiar List
Since 2014, “mob lynching” has become a grim fixture of Indian political vocabulary, most often associated with states such as Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Jharkhand. In recent years, journalist Ali Javed argues in a new Nous Explainers segment, another state has entered that conversation: Odisha. In June 2024, the Bharatiya Janata Party formed a government there on its own for the first time — and communal tensions have since risen sharply.
The scale of that rise was confirmed by the state's own chief minister. On March 9, responding to a question from BJD MLA Gautam Buddha Das in the Odisha assembly, Chief Minister Mohan Charan Majhi admitted that since his government took office, the state had recorded 54 incidents of communal violence and seven cases of mob lynching. Those targeted, Javed notes, were disproportionately Muslims, Dalits, and tribal Christians. But this was not a sudden eruption, he argues — it was the outcome of a decades-long political and ideological project that reshaped how identity is mobilized in the state.
Building a Hindu Heartland, 1940s–2009
To understand the shift, Javed traces the story back to the 1940s, when the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh began expanding its presence in Odisha. The RSS regarded the region as a distinct Hindu cultural landscape shaped by the traditions of Lord Jagannath and the temple town of Puri. Rather than confronting local custom, it fused Hindutva ideology with Jagannath devotion. By the 1960s, Sangh-affiliated bodies had put down roots in the state: the Bharatiya Jana Sangh as its political wing, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad as its student wing, and the Vishva Hindu Parishad, whose stated aim was to organize and consolidate Hindu society.
That expansion was not free of violence. In 1964, communal riots broke out in Rourkela after trains carrying the bodies of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan arrived in the city. At least 28 people, all Muslims, were killed, and Javed says reports at the time implicated Sangh Parivar organizations in the violence. Politically, though, the movement stayed marginal for decades. The Jana Sangh won its first seats in the state assembly only after the Emergency ended in 1977, and even then was widely seen as representing Marwari traders from western India rather than local Odias. Only in the late 1980s did the party — by then reorganized as the BJP — begin building real influence, riding a national wave of Hindu nationalist mobilization built around the VHP's Ram Janmabhoomi movement and Doordarshan's broadcasts of Ramayan and Mahabharat.
Regional politics nonetheless kept its grip on the state. The Biju Janata Dal, founded by Naveen Patnaik in 1997 in continuation of his father Biju Patnaik's legacy, has governed Odisha since 2000. A crucial opening for the BJP came through its alliance with the BJD from 1998 to 2009, which gave it ministerial positions and helped it build a base in western Odisha and among upper-caste and tribal communities. The same period, though, saw a string of communal incidents, with Christian missionaries and tribal Christians repeatedly targeted and, in several cases, pressured to convert back to Hinduism. In 1999, Bajrang Dal members — the VHP's militant youth wing — burned Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two young sons alive. Tensions simmered for years until, in December 2007, minor clashes in Kandhamal escalated into full-blown anti-Christian riots in 2008, triggered by the murder of VHP leader Laxmanananda Saraswati, who had led “ghar wapsi” campaigns to reconvert tribal communities to Hinduism. Police records cited by Javed put the toll at 395 churches destroyed, more than 4,500 homes burned across 400 villages, and over 55,000 people displaced, many fleeing to relief camps or into Andhra Pradesh. Naveen Patnaik, then chief minister, publicly acknowledged the Bajrang Dal and other Sangh Parivar organizations had a direct hand in the violence, and soon after broke his alliance with the BJP. In the 2009 election, the BJP's fortunes collapsed: it won just six of 147 assembly seats.
Quiet Rebuilding and the Odia Asmita Campaign
Even so, Javed notes, the Sangh Parivar did not retreat. For years, Hindutva organizations quietly expanded their grassroots networks through schools, social programs, and cultural mobilization, while the BJP's 2014 national victory gave the state unit fresh momentum: it gradually overtook the Congress to become the BJD's principal challenger. By 2024, Javed argues, the BJP had changed the terms of competition. Its pitch in Odisha had long rested on welfare and development; in 2024, it instead turned the election into a contest over identity, built around “Odia asmita,” or Odia pride — with Lord Jagannath at its center. Where the BJP typically foregrounds Lord Ram in northern India, in Odisha it embraced Jagannath culture as both a regional symbol and part of a broader Hindu civilizational identity. The BJD tried to compete on the same ground, promoting Puri as a world heritage destination and hosting the first World Odia Language Conference in Bhubaneswar. But the shift, Javed says, handed the BJP an opening it pressed aggressively: the party accused the BJD of trying to install a “non-Odia” chief minister, an unmistakable reference to V.K. Pandian, a Tamil bureaucrat and close aide to Naveen Patnaik. A single line soon echoed across the state: Odisha's chief minister must be Odia.
The BJP paired this with deliberate outreach to tribal communities. Narendra Modi repeatedly invoked the tribal freedom fighter Birsa Munda, and in 2021 the government declared his birth anniversary “Janjatiya Gaurav Diwas,” National Tribal Pride Day. After 2024, it reinforced that message in office, making tribal leader Mohan Charan Majhi chief minister and naming Juel Oram Union Minister for Tribal Affairs. The strategy shows in the numbers: the BJP performed strongly in western and northwestern Odisha, where the tribal population is concentrated, winning 42 percent of the Scheduled Tribe vote against the BJD's 27 percent, per CSDS data cited in the segment, while lifting its rural vote share by roughly 10 points and gaining ground among upper castes, upper OBCs, and Dalits. Javed also cites The Caravan's count of at least 73 RSS-affiliated organizations now active across the state, running everything from tribal hostels to cow-protection committees.
The Ecosystem's Endpoint
It is this same dense ecosystem, Javed argues, that has produced the pattern now visible across the state: mob lynchings tied to organizations aligned with the ruling Sangh Parivar. One recent case involved Sheikh Makrand Mohammad, a Muslim man allegedly lynched by cow vigilantes linked to the Bajrang Dal; the accused were acquaintances of his family, named in the police FIR. Such cases, Javed says, show how quickly ideology turns into violence once vigilante groups sense power stands behind them — and how a word that once felt remote to Odisha, lynching, has become part of the state's everyday reality.
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