Nous Podcast· 15 Jul 2026· 36:17

The Hate Machine: How Indian Muslims Are Dehumanised

How does an ordinary disagreement become a story of civilisational conflict? Why are Indian Muslims so often portrayed as a threat rather than fellow citizens? This explainer examines the historical, ideological, and political processes that fuel the dehumanisation of Indian Muslims. It explores …

Full Transcript

This story starts with a water balloon. March 4th, 2026. It's Holi. The Hindu festival of colors and a narrow lane in West Delhi is doing what Delhi lanes do on Holi. Color everywhere. Music and somewhere in the middle of all of it, a water balloon falls from a terrace [music] and hits a Muslim woman below. That's the beginning. By the next morning, a 26-year-old man named Tarun Kumar is dead. Within days, 14 people from the Muslim community were arrested. Portions of an accused's home demolished without a court order. And 70 shops had their fronts bulldozed in an encroachment drive. Within a week, Muslim families who have lived in that colony for 50 years are quietly packing up and leaving. Here's what I want to understand. Not just what happened, but why this keeps happening. Not just in this colony but in city after city decade after decade across India. Because this isn't a story about a water balloon. This is a story about a machine. A machine over a 100red years old built specifically to do exactly what happened in that lane. And to understand it we need to go back. Not 10 years not even 50. We need to go back to the beginning. But first, let's be honest about what we actually know about that evening because there are five different versions of this story and they contradict each other in important ways. Version one, Tarun's family. A young girl accidentally dropped a water balloon from a terrace. It hit a Muslim woman below. The family apologized, but the woman gathered a mob who came back with sticks and iron pipes. Tarun arrived at the scene and [music] was beaten to death. Version two, the accused family. A member named Shaheen says that the balloon wasn't thrown by a child. It was thrown by a 20-year-old man, and she says four drunk young men had been harassing her aunt, touching her without consent when her brother tried to intervene. A fight broke out. In this version, Tarun wasn't an innocent bystander. He was called to the scene and arrived on a motorcycle with 15 to 20 armed drunk associates. And here's the most explosive detail. Shaheen alleges that the fatal blow to Tarun's head came not from her family, but from his own associate, [music] Arun, in the chaos of the brawl. Version three, police and local residents. These two families have known each other for 50 years. normal not a communal version four right-wing Hindu organizations a targeted communal attack jihadi attack retribution is required >> [screaming] >> Version five, civil rights groups. A neighborhood brawl deliberately communalized by political actors with all the legal and physical consequences falling on the Muslim community. So which version is true? We don't know yet. The criminal investigation is ongoing and that's actually the point. None of what followed depended on knowing the truth. The machine doesn't need clarity to operate. It needs only two things. a violent dispute and a cross community altercation. Before we get to the machine, we need to understand the place. JJ colonies are India's informal urban settlements housing tens of millions of Delhi's working poor behind shared walls in shared courtyards around shared water taps. Resources are genuinely scarce. And when resources are scarce, conflict is constant. Not religious conflict, just conflict. Studies of communal violence consistently find the same thing. It's in these dense pressured settlements that the match lights fastest. Not because people are more hateful, but because the friction is higher and the space is smaller. The same two families fight over parking on a Tuesday and sort it out. But if the right actors arrive with a different frame for what that fight was really about, everything changes. That's what happened in Hustasal colony. A resident who has lived there for over 50 years said all of us celebrate [music] Holi Eid Diwali and visit each other's homes. What happened was unfortunate. 50 years of shared festivals overritten in a week. How? By what? To answer that we need to go back about a century. Here's the thing that surprises most people. The idea that Hindus and Muslims are ancient, irreconcilable civilizational enemies is not ancient. It's modern. It was built. In the late 1800s, the British began counting people by religion and tying political representation to those counts. Suddenly, your community's headcount determined [music] your power. For the first time, the precise size of the Muslim population was a matter of public record. And for Hindu elites operating in a system [music] that tied representation to numbers, those numbers were alarming. A large Muslim population newly visible, newly countable, was now legible as a political threat. This anxiety compounded a material reality [music] already underway. The decline of Muslim rule and the consolidation of British power had drawn a new Hindu elite educated, employed, [music] advantaged by colonial institutions. While large sections of the Muslim population were being left behind economically, the census had made Muslims simultaneously threatening in number and vulnerable in circumstance, a combination that proved explosive. Religion and economic procarity were now fused into a single political category. And in that [music] environment, riots started happening over a pig placed at a mosque, a cow slaughtered near a temple. These weren't ancient hatreds erupting. They were new political incentives. This template got refined over the decades. But in the early 20th century, it hit a fork in the road. On one path were nationalists who used Hindu identity to fight British colonialism. Telak revived festivals like Ganesh Taturi not just as religious observances but as mass political gatherings. The enemy was the colonizer and on the other a different group who wanted to turn that same identity against [music] Indian Muslims. Same tool completely different target. This second path has a name and one central architect. [music] Vinayak Damudar Sawer. Militant Hindu nationalism had already been rising for [music] decades in the Hindu Mahasabha in the cow protection movements in the riots. What Saburker does in 1922 writing from a British prison is to [music] give its clearest articulation. His argument is simple and devastating. A true Indian he says is someone for whom India is both their fatherland and their holy land. Hindus both six both Buddhists both Muslims their holy land is Makkah Christians Jerusalem therefore Muslims and Christians cannot [music] truly belong. They are guests in someone else's country. With one philosophical argument, he has made over 200 million Indian Muslims and Christians aliens in their own land. But the exclusion argument only works if it rests on a prior wound and sufferers supplies one. The Hindu civilization, he argues, was not mereily a majority in its own land. It was a civilization that had been invaded, [music] humiliated, and dispossessed. Centuries of Muslim rule meant temples destroyed, culture subordinated. The Hindu majority made strangers in their own home. This narrative of historical victimhood is the emotional engine of the entire project. It transforms exclusion into justice, aggression into restoration. You're not targeting a minority. You are reclaiming what was taken. The grievance is real enough to feel ancient enough to be unfalsifiable and useful enough to be deployed against every new incident. Historians have examined these claims carefully. >> Temples are profoundly political institutions. It's where sovereign authority is established uh uh reconfirmed [music] and contested >> and this is a a pattern that long precedes the arrival of Muslim church. >> Medieval India was not a story of uniform religious persecution. Most rulers governed through accommodation, patronized temples, employed Hindu administrators. The destruction narrative is a selective reading of a mixed history curated for political use. But victimhood narratives don't require the history to be accurate. They require it to be felt. Now this needs an organization to carry it and that's where the RSS comes in. The Rashtria Suyam Seak is founded in 1925. Its second chief MS Gulwalker leads it for over 30 years and turns it from a fringe organization into a mass movement. Over a million members, dozens of affiliated groups the network called the Sank Parivar. Gulwalker's writing is not subtle. He says minorities have two choices. Absorb entirely into Hindu culture or live at [music] the majority's mercy. He looks at Nazi Germany's treatment of Jews and writes admiringly that it is a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn. He's not writing a fantasy. He's [music] writing an operational plan. The RSS is not a command and control structure. It's more [music] like a franchisee. The RSS builds the ideology and trains the Carter. The BJP translates that into electoral power. The VHP and the Bajrangal are the street level units. The ones who show up in the neighborhoods after incidents like Holi. Nobody calls headquarters. The ideology is the instruction set. That's what makes it so hard to stop. Now we can talk about the machine. Political scientist Paul Brass spent decades studying communal violence in northern India and arrived at a conclusion as precise as it is disturbing. Large-scale Hindu Muslim riots are not spontaneous. They are produced. They require what brass calls an institutional riot system. There are specific rules. Informants alert political leaders when a sensitive incident occurs. Propagandists shape it into a message. Vernacular journalists publish that message as [music] news. Poster plasterers put it on walls. Rumor mongers spread it by word of mouth. Recruiters gather the crowds and [music] wait for the signal. Two roles are pivotal here. One, the fire tender works between riots, keeping communal grievances warm, surfacing real or fabricated flash points [music] so animosities never fully cool. and two, the conversion specialist is the trigger. He takes a local incident and reframes it as a communal [music] attack requiring response. Now add a layer brass couldn't fully account for in the 1990s, the media infrastructure. Today, narrative reframing travels by WhatsApp to locality, city, and national groups in minutes. Local cable news picks it up within hours. It cells boost it nationally by nightfall. By the time a journalist records this isn't a communal issue, the counternarrative is reaching a fraction of the audience the original frame has already reached. The speed of the amplification infrastructure is itself a weapon. Here is the method step by step. Find a fracture. You don't invent the spark. You just need to be ready when it happens. Reinterpret. Assign a communal frame. The vocabulary is preloaded. Then mobilize outside actors, show up within hours, [music] plant flags, push the people who actually live there out of the frame and then amplify. The narrative reaches a 100 times more people than any correction can. Then activate the state asymmetrically. This is where the machine becomes most dangerous. Let's go back to Hustasal colony. 14 people from the Muslim community are arrested. That's expected. There's a death. There are accused and there's a criminal investigation. That is how law enforcement is supposed to work. But then a mob chanting Jes enters an accused's home in front of police and vandalizes it. The police don't intervene and then the bulldozers. March 8th, portions of an accused's home demolished. No court order, no conviction, no trial. March 14th, 70 shops sealed and demolished. This didn't happen in a political vacuum. Since Chief [music] Minister Yogi Adityinat pioneered bulldozer action in Uttar Pradesh spectacularly publicly with television cameras invited to watch it has been replicated as [music] an explicit postcriminal punishment tool across BJP governed states. The bulldozer has [music] become a political symbol the state as avenger before any court has spoken. I want to be fair to the government's argument. These are illegal structures on public land. The municipal authority has both the right and the obligation to remove encroachments. And that's not entirely wrong. But here is what it leaves out. Juggy Joji colonies don't exist by accident. The state tolerates them for decades because they supply cheap labor. And when the land underneath them becomes valuable enough for a corporate project, a road, a redevelopment scheme, the state demolishes them in the name of encroachment or beautifification or public interest. Urban researchers have documented for decades that even before Hindutva, these drives fell disproportionately on Muslim neighborhoods and Dalith and lowercast settlements. The communities with the least political capital, the least legal documentation, the least access to the courts. The encroachment law was already doing quiet discriminatory work. And here is what makes it so effective as a weapon. Because informal property is structurally pervasive across Indian cities, almost any home, shop or wall in a JJ colony is legally exposed if someone chooses to. The loophole is not the exception. It is the condition of urban life for tens of millions of people. What has changed is that it is now openly deployed against Muslims in the specific aftermath of communal incidents. The selective has become the declared. Now, three reasons this is still an injustice. One, timing. These violations existed before March 4th. The political demand for bulldozer action was made publicly. Enforcement followed within 96 hours [music] specifically against Muslim structures. timing is not incidental. It is the message. The Supreme Court in 2024 ruled it [music] unconstitutional. No demolition without notice, a documented hearing, a written order, a real opportunity for legal recourse. Now, third, who [music] benefits from this? Those 70 shops were the economic spine of the Muslim majority section of the colony. Demolish [music] them and you disrupt livelihoods. Clear commercially valuable land and make a statement about whose presence in that neighborhood is permanent and whose is contingent. The material and political incentives are perfectly aligned. The message is not legal. It is territorial. Your presence here is conditional. All of it revocable. Then the machine's final step activates without anyone giving an order. Step six, the exodus. Muslim families in Hustasal look at what's happened in the last week. Neighbors arrested, shops demolished, colony covered in saffron flats. a public rally where a speaker said >> and faced no arrest. The threat was made in public on camera. The state did not move. Notice what this means for what comes next. If violence happens at Eid, the machinery gets what it demanded. Another incident, another [music] cycle, another round of arrests and demolitions and flags. And if Eid passes quietly, a different machinery activates. The BJP was not Hindu enough. Muslims were appeased. The state failed to protect Hindus. The movement must go further. Either outcome moves the floor. Either outcome shifts the public conversation rightward. The machine is not gambling on a particular result. It has designed a situation where every result advances the project. The ratchet only turns one way and the Muslims leave. Not because they were ordered out, because they read the situation correctly. The state has demonstrated it will not protect them. The cost of staying is now higher than the cost of leaving. The neighborhood slowly homogenizes. The constitutional right to live where you choose [music] quietly erased. Hustasal colony in 2026 is not an isolated incident. It is one instance of a pattern. In every case that follows this template, certain things are constant. A mundane initial incident with a disputed account. Outside organizational actors arriving within 24 to 48 hours. The narrative shift from personal to civilizational. Asymmetric state response. Muslims arrested. Hindu perpetrators largely uncharged, demolitions or displacement of Muslim property, incitement speeches with no legal consequence and over months demographic shift in the affected locality. What varies is scale, speed of judicial intervention and media coverage because national attention tends to produce faster court intervention. The 2002 Gujarat program is the most extensively documented case. Over a thousand Muslims killed, tens of thousands displaced. [music] Investigators documented that state officials were involved. >> Since February, the Muslims of Gujarat have been the target of unprecedented brutality, often at the hands of those who are meant to protect them, the police. >> Hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of places of worship, mosques and dhas were destroyed. Some of them were destroyed not by fire but by bulldozer and a road was built overnight. Could this be done without state enterprise? The chief minister of Gujarat during those riots became the prime minister in 2014. The 2020 Delhi riots 53 killed predominantly Muslim were preceded by open threats. BJP leader Kapil Mishra said violence began within hours. I want to say this carefully. Not every incident like this is manufactured from scratch. Some conflicts do involve genuine hostility. The machine's genius is not that it invents conflict. It's that it processes existing conflict. The friction in Hustasal was real. Six decades of disputes, genuine scarcity, a brawl that turned fatal. The machine just needs to pick it up, reframe it, and attach it to a pre-existing story about civilizational war. [music] That's what makes the frame credible. The anger is real. The loss Tarun Kumar's family experienced is real. The machine just reroutes where that anger gets directed. This is also why the reinterpretation step works so fast. A brawl over a water balloon doesn't need to be explained as a communal attack. It only needs to be named as one. The audience already knows the rest of the story. They learned it long before March 4th on their WhatsApp groups, on their YouTube channels, and on their Instagram stories. I want to try to understand the people who believed this. Not the organizers but the ordinary residents of JJ colonies across India who when men arrive with saffron flags and a story about civilizational war find that story compelling because the narrative the Sankari offers that Hindus are under demographic threat. That love jihad is converting Hindu women of jihad is a reality. Islamist radicalization is a reality. >> Muslims are planning to outnumber and overwhelm Hindus. This narrative is empirically false. India's Muslim population growth rate is now nearly equal to the Hindu rate. There is no evidence of an organized conversion conspiracy and the demographic replacement claim is a global template of the far right. >> Great replacement. Now that is a French homegrown theory. >> In the simplest of terms, it's the idea that there is some master plan to diminish white power. >> But it correctly names genuine anxiety. You live in a JJ colony. Water pressure is unreliable. Your kids compete for government jobs against thousands of applicants. The city is changing around you and none of it feels controllable. And someone arrives and says this is happening to you because of them. That's the offer. You're not a struggling daily wage worker. You're a Hindu defending a civilization. And not just any civilization, a wounded one, one that was great, then conquered, then humiliated across centuries of Muslim rule, then straightened into a colonial framework that benefited everyone. But you your procarity today is not random misfortune. It is the last chapter of a very long story of dispossession. And Muslims living beside you in the same colony competing for the same jobs using the same water tap are not your neighbors in a shared predicament. They are the continuation of that story. Your struggle has meaning. Enemies and a community that will show up for you. This is why Tarun Kumar's Dalith identity matters. Daliths occupy the same economic tier as their Muslim neighbors, compete for the same resources and sometimes have their own grievances. The Sankari doesn't invent this tension. It finds it and then makes its offer. Don't be a Dalith fighting cast oppression. Be a Hindu with the protection of the majority. Scholars call this sub altern Hinduts absorbing Dalith anger into a majoritarian project redirecting it outward instead of upward. What it doesn't say that the S's founders celebrated a hierarchy that always put Dalits at the bottom. That the protection evaporates the moment Dalits assert their own political interests. That the Ambitkarite tradition is a direct [music] alternative to this offer. Here's one of the most important things to understand about what's happening in India right now. The constitution doesn't need to be rewritten for this project to succeed. Drafted under Brmkar's leadership in the immediate shadow of the partition, it guaranteed equal citizenship regardless of religion. The right to live where you choose, protection from arbitrary punishment, freedom of conscience written specifically to prevent India from becoming what Golwalker wanted. But you don't need to overturn the constitution to make it irrelevant. Two things are happening simultaneously. And to understand what is new, you need to understand what is not. The first is a gap between what the constitution says and what people experience. [music] This gap is not new. Under Congress era secular nationalism, Muslims faced discrimination in housing, policing, and employment. Riots produced the same asymmetric state response, the same impunity. The secular republic never fully delivered on its constitutional promise to its Muslim citizens. What is new is not the gap but its intensity, [music] its explicitness and the disappearance of any formal embarrassment about it. The second process is more fundamental and unlike the gap, it has no precedent in the secular era. The constitution recognized Muslim personal law, Hindu personal law, the rights of religious communities to govern their own affairs and personal matters. [music] It placed the uniform civil code as a future aspiration, a directive principle deliberately unresolved because the framers could not reconcile the tension between equality and religious autonomy in 1950 and chose not to force the question. Congress worked within that tension however imperfectly. What is happening now is different in kind. Constitutional provisions are being reinterpreted through a Hindu civilizational lens so that a framework of deliberately held tensions becomes a hierarchy and the frame doing the rewriting is not constitutional secularism. It is Hindu civilizational primacy. The longerterm architecture of the legal constraint the disturbed areas act restricting property sales in designated neighborhoods used in Gujarat in ways that entrench segregation rather than prevent it. A community that can't sell its property in a mixed neighborhood is trapped. A community that can't buy property in a new area is excluded. The CAA goes further. It encodes [music] religious discrimination into citizenship law directly for the first time in the republic's history in [music] explicit violation of articles 14 and 15. A departure from constitutional logic written into statute. Counterterrorism laws applied asymmetrically against Muslim activists complete the picture. Accounting without a single constitutional amendment, without anything that looks in isolation like discrimination to the gradual practical reduction of Muslim citizenship. But the constraint architecture is [music] only the surface. Beneath it, the deliberate tensions the framers built into the constitution are being resolved by force in one direction. The UCCC as a directive principle since 1950 was always an aspiration toward eventual consensus. What is being pushed now is categorically different. unconstitutional. The constitution is being reread word by word until its secular commitments mean something else entirely. I want [music] to be careful here. Historical comparisons can obscure as much as they illuminate. India in 2026 is not Germany in 1938. The constitutional protections while eroded still exist. Courts still sometimes intervene. Civil society still functions. This comparison must not be used to flatten the tragedy of what happened in Europe or declare India's fate sealed. But the structural parallels are real. The scapegoated minority framed as an internal civilizational threat. legal and bureaucratic mechanisms used alongside extralegal violence, the gradual erosion of practical citizenship, while formal equality is preserved. The normalization through repetition through impunity of what were initially shocking acts. What connects these cases is a single logic. The claim [music] that a civilization belongs to one people alone. That others living within it are guests at best [music] and threats at worst. This logic has appeared in different forms across the 20th and 21st centuries. [music] Its consequences have been consistent. History teaches this. The logic of ethnic and religious closure does not deliver what it promises. It promises civilizational glory. It produces civilizational self-destruction. Nazi Germany did not produce a flowering of German civilization. It produced ruins and a permanent [music] stain on a nation's name. The Jewish people survived the Holocaust and from that survival built both a moral vocabulary and a political project. the Neuremberg principles, the genocide convention, crimes against humanity, these emerged from what was done to Jews in Europe. And then Gassa, >> I find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that their threshold indicating the commission of the crime of genocide against Palestinians as a group in Gaz has been met. What is happening there represents a particular kind of tragedy. A people who survived history's worst atrocity reproducing its defining logic against another people. The moral authority that survival grants is being consumed by the conduct it was supposed to prevent. Victimhood does not inoculate against perpetration. Modi's visit to Israel in February 2026, only his second, 9 years after the first, was not incidental. He addressed the Nesset, the first Indian prime minister to do so and declared, >> "India stands with Israel firmly with full conviction in this moment and beyond." [applause] [music] He visited Yadvasham, the Holocaust memorial. He said nothing about Gaza. The USIsrael strikes on Iran began less than 48 hours after he left. [music] India is now Israel's largest arms buyer. The RSS has long looked at Zionism with ideological sympathy. >> Hindu nationalism and [music] Zionism kind of walls together very very easily. You know, if [music] you think you're the chosen people, uh within Hinduism is the cast system where Brahinss are the chosen people. So the segue [music] into that sort of fascist thinking is not a hard one to me. >> If a people can build an ethnoreigious state and defend it by force, so can Hindus. The founding fathers of Hindutwa admired Nazi Germany. Their successors prime minister laid a wreath at the memorial to Nazi Germany's victims. Embraced a leader wanted by the International Criminal Court and flew home as the bombs began to fall. The logic connecting these moments is the consistent thread of ethnic and religious nationalism followed wherever it leads. A movement claiming to defend Hindu civilizational glory by these method is not protecting a civilization. It is submitting to the same forces that have already produced ruins once and are producing them again. So let me bring this all the way back. A water balloon, a fight, a death. A machine refined over a hundred years activates within hours. It finds the fracture real, pre-existing, and widens it. Reinterprets the event through a narrative of civilizational injury that was constructed in a British prison in 1922 and has [music] been kept warm ever since. Mobilizes outside actors, amplifies through WhatsApp and local TV before any journalist can get a correction out. deploys the bulldozer normalized across BJP governed states demanded delivered within the week [music] and then waits for fear to do the rest of the work. Families who have lived there for 50 years quietly, [music] rationally leave. A neighborhood that was mixed is being demographically reshaped just by accumulated weight of arrests, demolitions, flags, and speeches that went unanswered by law. That's the machine. Now, here's the question I keep coming back to. When you understand it, when you can see it operating, name its parts, trace its ideology to the men who built it, and trace their inspirations to the regimes that preceded them. What do you do with that knowledge? The machine depends on ordinary people accepting the frame it offers. On the Dalith worker in a JJ colony, believing his procarity is a chapter in a civilizational story rather than a political economy that has always exploited [music] him. On the story of ancient Hindu victimhood being more legible than the colonial census that made it politically useful. On [music] the story of civilizational war being more legible than 50 years of shared festivals and on those of us watching from a distance treating each incident as [music] isolated, as local as someone else's problem. It isn't. This video was recorded while the machine was still running. By the time you watch it, the ratchet will have turned again. That is not a reason to wait before understanding it. It is the reason to understand.

Companion article

A Water Balloon, a Death, and Five Accounts

On Holi in early March, in a lane in the Hastsal colony of West Delhi, a water balloon thrown from a terrace struck a Muslim woman below. By the next morning a 26-year-old man named Tarun Kumar was dead, killed in the brawl that followed. Within days 14 people from the neighbourhood's Muslim community had been arrested, part of an accused's home had been demolished without a court order, and 70 shops had had their fronts bulldozed in what authorities called an anti-encroachment drive. Within a week, Muslim families who had lived in the colony for fifty years were packing up and leaving.

What actually happened that night is still disputed. Tarun's family says a child accidentally dropped the balloon, the woman it hit gathered a mob, and Tarun was beaten to death when he arrived at the scene. A relative of the accused named Shaheen gives a different account: that the balloon was thrown by an adult, that drunk young men had been harassing her aunt, and that the blow which killed Tarun came not from her family but from one of his own companions in the chaos. Police and long-time residents describe it as an ordinary dispute between two families who had coexisted for decades. Right-wing Hindu organisations called it a targeted, retributive attack. Civil rights groups called it a neighbourhood brawl deliberately communalised by outside political actors. The criminal investigation is still ongoing — and that, this account argues, is the point. Nothing that followed the killing depended on anyone establishing the truth. What the system that took over that week needed was not clarity. It needed only a violent dispute and a cross-community incident to attach itself to.

Manufacturing an Ancient Enmity

Jhuggi-jhopri colonies like Hastsal are informal settlements housing tens of millions of Delhi's working poor around shared water taps and courtyards, where resource scarcity makes conflict constant — not usually religious conflict, just conflict between neighbours. What turns an ordinary fight into a civilisational one is a frame that was built, deliberately, about a century ago.

The idea that Hindus and Muslims are ancient, irreconcilable enemies is not itself ancient. It emerged after the British began counting Indians by religion in the late 1800s and tying political representation to those counts, making a community's headcount a measure of its power for the first time. A newly countable Muslim population, alongside a Hindu elite advantaged by colonial institutions, made religion and economic precarity fuse into a single political category — a combination that fed riots over disputes as small as a cow slaughtered near a temple.

That template found its clearest articulation in 1922, when Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, writing from a British prison, argued that a true Indian must hold India as both fatherland and holy land — which made Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists native but rendered Muslims and Christians, whose holy sites lie elsewhere, permanent guests. He paired that exclusion with a claim of injury: that Hindu civilisation had been invaded, humiliated and dispossessed under centuries of Muslim rule. Historians who have examined that narrative describe medieval India's record as one of accommodation as much as conflict, with many rulers patronising temples and employing Hindu administrators — a mixed history selectively read for political use. But a victimhood narrative does not need to be accurate. It needs to be felt, and it turns exclusion into restoration and aggression into justice.

From Ideology to Organisation

That ideology needed a vehicle, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, founded in 1925, became it. Its longest-serving chief, M.S. Golwalkar, ran the organisation for three decades and turned it from a fringe group into a movement with over a million members and a network of affiliates known as the Sangh Parivar. Golwalkar wrote that minorities had two choices — full absorption into Hindu culture or life at the majority's mercy — and pointed to Nazi Germany's treatment of Jews as, in his words, a lesson worth learning. That was not rhetorical flourish; it was an operational template.

The Sangh Parivar functions less like a chain of command than a franchise: the RSS builds ideology and trains cadre, the BJP converts it into electoral power, and street-level units like the VHP and Bajrang Dal are the ones who show up in neighbourhoods after incidents like the one in Hastsal. Nobody needs to call headquarters. The ideology itself is the instruction set, which is what makes the pattern so difficult to interrupt.

The Institutional Riot System

The political scientist Paul Brass spent decades studying communal violence in northern India and concluded that large-scale riots are not spontaneous outbursts but produced events, run through what he called an institutional riot system. Informants alert political actors when a sensitive incident occurs; propagandists reframe it; local media report the frame as news; posters and rumour carry it further; and recruiters assemble crowds to wait for a signal. Two roles matter most: a 'fire tender' who keeps grievances warm between incidents so animosities never fully cool, and a 'conversion specialist' who takes a local dispute and reframes it as a communal attack demanding response.

What Brass could not fully anticipate in the 1990s is the speed digital media adds to that machinery. A reframed narrative now travels by WhatsApp to local, city and national groups within minutes, is picked up by local cable news within hours, and is amplified nationally by nightfall — long before a journalist can publish a correction reaching a fraction of that audience. The method, step by step: find a fracture, assign it a communal frame from a pre-loaded vocabulary, mobilise outside actors within hours, and amplify before contradiction is possible.

A State That Responds on One Side

The riot system's most dangerous stage is what follows: the state acting asymmetrically. In Hastsal, fourteen arrests of Muslim residents were unremarkable given an actual death under investigation. But a mob was then allowed to enter an accused's home chanting slogans, unchallenged by the police present, before bulldozers arrived — a portion of that home demolished on March 8th with no court order, and seventy shops sealed and demolished on March 14th, also without conviction or trial.

Demolition as extrajudicial punishment was pioneered publicly, with television cameras invited, by Uttar Pradesh's chief minister Yogi Adityanath, and has since been replicated across BJP-governed states as a political symbol — the state as avenger before any court has spoken. The government's underlying legal argument, that these are illegal structures on public land, is not baseless: jhuggi-jhopri colonies exist in a state of tolerated illegality that authorities exploit whenever the land beneath them becomes valuable, and researchers have long documented that such demolitions fall disproportionately on Muslim, Dalit and lower-caste settlements even without a triggering riot. What has changed is not the discrimination but its timing and openness — enforcement arriving within 96 hours of a public demand, specifically against Muslim structures, after India's Supreme Court had ruled in 2024 that demolitions require notice, a hearing and a written order. The shops targeted were the economic spine of the colony's Muslim section; clearing them served a political and material interest at once, sending an unmistakable message that residence there is conditional and revocable.

A newer layer of law extends the same logic. Gujarat's Disturbed Areas Act restricts property sales in designated neighbourhoods in ways that entrench segregation, trapping communities that cannot sell out of a mixed area and excluding them from buying into a new one. The Citizenship Amendment Act goes further, encoding religious discrimination into citizenship law for the first time in the republic's history. None of this requires amending the constitution. It requires only that constitutional guarantees be reread until their secular commitments mean something else.

Why the Neighbours Leave

The system's final step needs no order from anyone. After the arrests, demolitions and unpunished rally speeches in Hastsal, Muslim families calculated that the cost of staying now exceeded the cost of leaving, and left — not because they were expelled, but because they read the situation correctly. If violence recurs at the next festival, the same machinery repeats; if it passes quietly, a rival current inside the movement argues the state was not Hindu enough and pushes further. Either outcome moves public opinion the same direction, which is why Hastsal is one instance of a recurring template rather than an aberration: a mundane disputed incident, outside actors within 24 to 48 hours, a shift from personal to civilisational language, arrests concentrated on Muslims while Hindu perpetrators largely go uncharged, demolition or displacement, and unpunished incitement, followed over months by a demographic shift.

That template is visible at scale in the 2002 Gujarat violence, in which over a thousand Muslims were killed and tens of thousands displaced with documented state involvement, and whose chief minister at the time, Narendra Modi, became prime minister in 2014; and in the 2020 Delhi riots that killed 53 people, most of them Muslim, after BJP leader Kapil Mishra issued open threats hours before violence began. The friction the system exploits is often genuine — the scarcity in Hastsal, the six decades of disputes between two families, the real grief of Tarun Kumar's relatives — and the system's power lies in redirecting that anger rather than inventing it, attaching it to a story residents have already absorbed from their WhatsApp groups and YouTube feeds long before any single incident occurs.

A Pattern With Global Company

The claim that a demographic threat justifies exclusion is empirically false in India — Muslim and Hindu population growth rates have nearly converged, with no evidence of an organised conversion campaign — but it borrows a structure common to ethnonationalist movements elsewhere, from the 'great replacement' theory associated with the European and American far right to the logic that let Nazi Germany's persecution of Jews serve as an admired model for Golwalkar. Precarious residents in a colony like Hastsal are offered a story that turns their unresolved grievances — unreliable water, competition for scarce government jobs, an economy that has left them behind — into chapters of civilisational restoration rather than symptoms of political neglect, a story capable of absorbing Dalit anger, which shares the same economic tier as Muslim neighbours, and redirecting it outward rather than upward against caste hierarchy.

The comparison to twentieth-century Europe is not a claim that India in 2026 is Germany in 1938: constitutional protections persist, courts intervene, and civil society still functions. But the structural elements recur — a scapegoated minority cast as a civilisational threat, legal mechanisms operating alongside extralegal violence, and the gradual normalisation of acts that were once shocking. Those parallels sharpened this year when Narendra Modi made his second visit to Israel, addressed the Knesset, visited the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial, and declared unconditional solidarity with Israel while saying nothing about Gaza, days before joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran; India has since become Israel's largest arms buyer. The affinity is not incidental — as one observer of the movement put it, a chosen-people theology sits comfortably alongside a caste system built on the same premise. A movement founded on the claim of Hindu civilisational injury has, in embracing that alliance, aligned itself with a state whose conduct a war-crimes body has found meets the threshold for genocide — a reminder, this account argues, that historical victimhood does not inoculate a people, or a movement invoking their history, against becoming a perpetrator in turn.

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